Dispersal is a key process for the emergence of social and biological behaviours. Yet, little attention has been paid to dispersal's effects on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in structured populations. To address this issue, we propose two new dispersal modes, parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal, incorporate them into the birth-death update rule, and consider the resultant strategy evolution in the prisoner's dilemma on random-regular, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively. We find that parent-preferred dispersal favours the evolution of cooperation in these different types of population structures, while offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation in homogeneous populations. On scale-free networks when the strength of parent-preferred dispersal is weak, cooperation can be enhanced at intermediate strengths of offspringpreferred dispersal, and cooperators can coexist with defectors at high strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal. Moreover, our theoretical analysis based on the pair-approximation method corroborates the evolutionary outcomes on random-regular networks. We also incorporate the two new dispersal modes into three other update rules (death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating), and find that similar results about the effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal can again be observed in the aforementioned different types of population structures. Our work, thus, unveils robust effects of preferential dispersal modes on the evolution of cooperation in different interactive environments.
Introduction
How to understand the emergence of cooperation among rational individuals is a central challenge in evolutionary biology, as well as in social sciences. Evolutionary game theory provides a common mathematical framework to interpret the evolution of cooperation [1 -3] . In particular, the prisoner's dilemma game, as a typical example, has attracted considerable attention [4, 5] . The prisoner's dilemma game is traditionally studied in infinite well-mixed populations, in which all individuals are equally likely to interact with each other. However, the well-mixed nature of populations typically opposes the evolution of cooperation [6] .
In the past few years, it has increasingly been realized that real populations are not well-mixed, but structured, which can be well described by some network models, e.g. small-world [7] and scale-free networks [8] . Many studies show that population structures can promote cooperation via network reciprocity [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In particular, network heterogeneity is identified as the main driving force behind the flourishing cooperative behaviour on scale-free networks [11, 12] . However, such positive effects of network reciprocity do not always hold well for the evolution of cooperation, even on heterogeneous networks. For example, the advantage of heterogeneous networks in the evolution of cooperation can be greatly weakened by participation costs [22] or normalizing the cumulative payoff [23] . The update rule also plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation on social networks [9,24 -26] . Remarkably, it is found that death -birth updating on social networks allows the evolution of cooperation if the benefit-to-cost ratio in the prisoner's dilemma exceeds the average degree of the network [13] . By contrast, under the birth-death update rule [27] cooperation cannot emerge in different types of population structures [13] . These findings show that the birth-death update rule can strongly suppress the factors through which network reciprocity favours the evolution of cooperation.
Under the original birth -death update rule, a parental player is chosen for reproduction from the entire population proportional to its fitness, and then the offspring replaces a random neighbour of the parent. Such offspring's dispersal influences the parent's fitness in the game, even if the dispersal is random and local. Thus replacing a neighbour of the parent by the offspring may cause competition between the offspring and the parent when interactions are local [28, 29] . Consequently, a parent may have an interest in choosing the offspring's site among its neighbours according to a preferential dispersal mode, rather than the random dispersal mode. And the same may apply to the offspring when acting in its own interest.
We thus consider two different preferential dispersal modes, driven by the interests of the parent and/or of the offspring [30] ; we call these modes parent-preferred dispersal and offspring-preferred dispersal, and assume that the new location for the offspring under the birth -death update rule is jointly determined by the parent's interests and the offspring's interests. Under offspring-preferred dispersal the offspring prefers to have a favourable interactive environment after leaving for the new site [31] , while under parent-preferred dispersal the parent prefers to improve or maintain its own interactive environment through the offspring's dispersal. This may correspond to the phenomenon that, for example, in the animal world the lion leader will abandon or ostracize young male lions, even his own offspring, in order to hold his predominance and reduce the competition from future generations [32] .
In this paper, we simultaneously incorporate the aforementioned two preferential dispersal modes into the birth-death update rule in structured populations, in which individuals can have some information about their local environments. We assume that individuals can not only observe their nearest neighbours, but also obtain information about other local individuals, because most individuals can only have local information about others in realistic networked systems [33, 34] . Based on such local information, the parent and its offspring can inspect the local environments around the possible new locations. The potential payoff or fitness of the parent and of the offspring that would result after the offspring's dispersal to different locations can thus guide parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal, so the new location for the offspring can be determined accordingly.
We then study how the new update rule based on parentpreferred and offspring-preferred dispersal affects the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game in different types of population structures described by random-regular [35] , small-world, and scale-free networks. Also, we use the pair-approximation method for a theoretical analysis on regular networks. We find that parent-preferred dispersal can always favour the evolution of cooperation in different types of population structures. In addition, offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation on homogeneous networks, whereas on heterogeneous networks cooperation can be promoted at intermediate strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal. We also explicitly incorporate parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal modes into three other strategy update rules describing death -birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating [27, [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] , and find that our main results about the effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal are robust against the changes of the update rules.
Model
We consider the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations. Following previous studies [5, 13] , we adopt the game's payoff matrix as
where b . 0 represents the benefit of cooperation and c (0 , c , b) represents the cost of cooperation; this simplified payoff matrix describes the donation game, one of the sub-classes of the prisoner's dilemma game [41] . To facilitate comparison between our results and previous works using the simplified payoff matrix [13, 27] , we retain the parameters b and c (based on which the dilemma strength can only be evaluated by the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c [41] ), instead of replacing them with the universal dilemma strength parameters [42, 43] . Initially, each player occupies one node of the network and is designated to play either as a cooperator (C) or as a defector (D). At each time step, each player x engages in pairwise interactions with all its adjacent neighbours and then collects its payoff P x based on the payoff matrix, resulting in the fitness
where w . 0 is the intensity of selection [44] . We adopt this exponential function to ensure that each individual's fitness is always positive. To avoid excessively amplifying the fitness differences in the population, we set w ¼ 0.01 in this study. After playing the games, an individual is chosen for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness, i.e. individual x is selected with probability f x /F, where F ¼ S y f y denotes the population's fitness sum. We assume that individual x reproduces an identical offspring x o , and only has local information about its nearest and next-nearest neighbours. Hence, parent x can evaluate its expected fitness and its offspring's expected fitness when a site in the parent's neighbourhood is chosen for its offspring. Using this expected fitness information, the probability of offspring x o replacing one of the neighbours y is set as 0 denotes the strength of parent-preferred dispersal. In particular, for a ¼ 0 and b ¼ 0 the offspring will replace a random neighbour of player x, and in this case the original birth-death rule is recovered [13] .
In this study, we focus on the effects of a and b on the evolution of cooperation in three different types of population structures described by random-regular, small-world, and scale-free networks. Instead of the fixation probability of cooperation, the key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behaviour of the population is the fraction of cooperators in the population. We use individual-based simulations as well as the pair-approximation method to perform this study.
Simulations are carried out in a population with size N ¼ 1000. The average number of neighbours in each network model (including random-regular, small-world, and scalefree networks) is set to 4. We implement the simulation with asynchronous updating [14, 45] . Initially, the two strategies of C and D are randomly distributed in the population with equal probability. Under the stochastic strategy evolution described above, the population will converge to one of the two possible absorbing states: full cooperation or full defection [33] . We run 100 independent realizations for each set of parameter values and compute the fraction of times that the population evolves to full cooperation [30, 33] . If the population does not converge to an absorbing state after 5 Â 10 6 updates, the cooperation level is determined by the average fraction of cooperators in the population over the last 2 Â 10 4 updates.
Results
First, we incorporate the proposed offspring-preferred and parent-preferred dispersal modes into the birth-death update rule, and show in figure 1 how the fraction of cooperators depends on a and b on random-regular, small-world, and scale-free networks. We see that on random-regular and small-world networks the cooperation level dramatically decreases as the strength a of offspring-preferred dispersal increases, whereas it strongly increases as the strength b of parent-preferred dispersal increases (figure 1a,b). Moreover, full defection can easily be achieved for strongly offspring-preferred dispersal and weakly parent-preferred dispersal, whereas full cooperation can easily be achieved for weakly offspring-preferred dispersal and strongly parent-preferred dispersal. However, on scale-free networks the cooperation level monotonically increases with the strength b of parentpreferred dispersal for fixed values of a (figure 1c). Conversely, the cooperation level gradually decreases with the strength a of offspring-preferred dispersal for larger fixed values of b. Surprisingly, for smaller fixed values of b (e.g. b ¼ 1), the cooperation level first increases with a from zero until reaching a maximum value, beyond which it decreases with a. This means that, for small values of b, the cooperation level can be maximized at an intermediate value of a. In addition, the cooperation level at large values of a is not very low, indicating that cooperators can coexist with defectors. These results for scale-free networks are obtained at b/ c ¼ 4, and can persist when the benefit-to-cost ratio is decreased or increased within bounds.
In figure 2 , we provide theoretical results obtained by the pair-approximation method for regular networks (see electronic supplementary material for details). We find that the random-regular small-world scale-free 10 theoretical results agree well with the simulation results for random-regular networks, as shown in figure 1a. However, this method does not well predict simulation results for other types of networks, especially not for scale-free networks. These later results might be improved by the extended pairapproximation method considering a network's clustering structures and degree fluctuation [13, 46] . Despite this point, our theoretical analysis qualitatively corroborates the roles of parent-preferred dispersal and offspring-preferred dispersal in the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.
What is the origin of the observed substantial boost of cooperation by the parent-preferred dispersal mode in all considered different types of population structures? When a defector is chosen for reproduction, it implies that this defector has a relatively higher fitness and is surrounded by some cooperators. Under parent-preferred dispersal, the defective parent prefers to let its offspring replace a defective neighbour, rather than a cooperative neighbour. In this situation, although the parent can safeguard its higher fitness, the spreading of defective behaviour is inhibited ( figure 3a) . Moreover, cooperators can also have the opportunity to be chosen for reproduction in these types of population structures, especially on scale-free networks. When a cooperator is chosen for reproduction, it implies that this cooperator has more cooperative direct neighbours than other cooperators. Under parent-preferred dispersal, if the cooperative parent also has defective direct neighbours, the cooperative parent prefers to let its offspring replace a defective neighbour, rather than a cooperative neighbour. Such a replacement expands clusters of cooperators, and hence the spreading of cooperative behaviour is promoted ( figure 3a) . This even leads to a positive feedback, so that cooperators can have more opportunities to be chosen for reproduction. Consequently, cooperative behaviour can evolve and prevail in structured populations.
Why does the offspring-preferred dispersal inhibit the evolution of cooperation on random-regular and smallworld networks? Under offspring-preferred dispersal, when a defector is chosen for reproduction, the offspring prefers to replace a neighbour who is connecting to more cooperators than other neighbours. Accordingly, this defective offspring replaces a cooperative neighbour of the parent. This is Figure 3 . Schematic illustrations of local configurations for understanding strategy evolution on homogeneous networks. We consider a cooperator-defector pair competing for the next reproduction. The defector with payoff 2b has a great advantage to be chosen for reproduction. However, its left cooperative neighbour with payoff 2b 2 4c can also have the opportunity to be chosen for reproduction under the birth-death rule. (a) Under parent-preferred dispersal, the offspring of the focal defector or cooperator prefers to replace a neighbouring defector, which induces a positive feedback for the expansion of cooperators. (b) Under offspring-preferred dispersal, the offspring of the focal defector prefers to replace a neighbouring cooperator, leading to the expansion of defectors. By contrast, the offspring of the focal cooperator prefers to replace a neighbouring cooperator, leading to a slow and eventually stagnating expansion of cooperators. C, cooperator; D, defector.
because the cooperative neighbour often connects to other cooperators under the birth -death rule, and it has the same (a similar) number of interacting neighbours than (as) others on random-regular (small-world) networks. While the defective offspring can thereby achieve a higher fitness, the defective behaviour is spreading (figure 3b). When a cooperator is chosen for reproduction, the offspring prefers to replace a cooperative neighbour of its parent so that the offspring can achieve a higher fitness on random-regular and small-world networks. Such a replacement hinders the expansion of clusters of cooperators, and hence the spreading of the cooperative behaviour is inhibited (figure 3b).
It still remains to explain why cooperators can persist on scale-free networks under strongly offspring-preferred dispersal. To do this, we investigate the time evolution of the bias in the distribution of cooperators across degree numbers on scale-free networks as shown in figure 4 . We first define the distribution bias for cooperators on nodes with degree k at time t as sign [ 
Here, p C (t) denotes the fraction of cooperators in the population at time t, and p Ck (t) denotes the fraction of cooperators on nodes with degree k at time t. This distribution bias characterizes how cooperators are distributed in heterogeneous populations. Its value is constrained between 21 and 1. When the value is positive (negative), the fraction of cooperators on nodes with degree k is higher (lower) than the fraction of cooperators in the population as a whole, indicating that relatively more (less) cooperators occupy nodes with degree k than nodes with other degrees. We find that for weakly offspring-preferred dispersal, as time increases, the fractions of cooperators on high-degree and medium-degree nodes first becomes lower than the fraction of cooperators in the population (figure 4a). Thus, cooperation cannot evolve in this situation. In contrast, for moderately offspring-preferred dispersal, as time increases, the fractions of cooperators on high-degree and mediumdegree nodes becomes higher than the fraction of cooperators in the population, which induces a positive feedback for the evolution of cooperation (figure 4b). Correspondingly, cooperators are often chosen for reproduction, and their cooperative offspring may prefer to choose to occupy a player's site with a degree other than that of their parents, which promotes the spreading of the cooperative behaviour. For strongly offspring-preferred dispersal, as time increases, there are always some fluctuations of the distribution biases of cooperators on high-degree and medium-degree nodes (figure 4c). Hence, cooperators cannot stably dominate the high-degree nodes, which play a crucial role in the emergence of cooperation on scale-free networks [11] . However, in such a situation cooperators can coexist with defectors for a long time. This is because on scale-free networks individuals occupying high-degree nodes are often chosen for reproduction. When a defector on a hub is chosen under strongly offspring-preferred dispersal, the defective offspring prefers to move into the site of a nearest neighbour with high degree. This induces a negative feedback that reduces the fitness of the involved defectors and thus their opportunity of being chosen for reproduction. When a cooperator on a hub is chosen under strongly offspring-preferred dispersal, the cooperative offspring also prefers to move into the site of a nearest neighbour with high degree. While this does not promote the expansion of clusters of cooperators, it can facilitate the coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
Finally, it is of interest to elaborate on the generality of the effectiveness of offspring-preferred and parent-preferred dispersal for the evolution of cooperation. To do this, we incorporate the offspring-preferred and parent-preferred dispersal modes into three other update rules, describing death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating (see electronic supplementary material for details). Also under these different update rules, parent-preferred dispersal can promote the evolution of cooperation in different types of population structures, and on scale-free networks cooperation can again be maximized at intermediate strengths of offspringpreferred dispersal when the strength of parent-preferred dispersal is not high (electronic supplementary material, figure S2 ). In comparison with figure 1, we find that a favourable cooperation level can be achieved under the birth-death update rule for a wider parameter range than under the other three update rules. Noticeably, full cooperation can be realized only in a relatively narrow parameter range under the pairwise comparison update rule, keeping in mind that the uncertainty value in the rule also influences the evolutionary outcome [14] .
Discussion
In this work, we have proposed how to incorporate two new dispersal modes simultaneously into the birth-death update rule. On this basis, we have shown that parent-preferred 10 -2 10 -1 probability, P(k) 
Here, p C (t) denotes the fraction of cooperators in the population at time t, and p Ck (t) denotes the fraction of cooperators on nodes with degree k at time t. (d) Degree distribution of scale-free networks with average degree k ¼ 4 and population size N ¼ 1000. In such networks, 70% of nodes have a degree not larger than 3, and 90% of nodes have a degree not larger than 6. Here, w ¼ 0.01 and b/c ¼ 4.
dispersal favours cooperation in different types of population structures, whereas offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation on homogeneous networks. For strongly offspring-preferred dispersal, cooperators can coexist with defectors for a long time in heterogeneous populations. In addition, we have introduced the two new dispersal modes into three other update rules describing death-birth, imitation, and pairwise compassion updating. For these other update rules, we have observed similar results for the effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. Our work thereby highlights the importance of the dispersal rules for the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. Local dispersal is widespread among species [29, 47] . Multiple factors jointly determine how an individual disperses from its natal site to a new site [30] . Such individual-level dispersal rules can influence the evolution of cooperative behaviour in a population [47] . Our new dispersal rule is simultaneously driven by parent's and offspring's preferences. A trade-off between these preferences often exists, and the underlying conflicts of interest and kin competition are expected to affect the dispersal site of the offspring. Here, we have evaluated the relative contributions of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal to the evolution of cooperation. Intuitively, one might expect that cooperation would be facilitated under strongly offspring-preferred dispersal. This is because the parental individual may sacrifice its own interests for maximizing its offspring's benefit in structured populations, leading to kin selection [6, 29] . However, we surprisingly find that it is parent-preferred dispersal, rather than offspring-preferred dispersal, that can favour the evolution of cooperation in different types of population structures. Although cooperators can coexist with defectors on scalefree networks under strongly offspring-preferred dispersal, this result critically depends on the specific topological features of scale-free networks. Thus, our results show that, counterintuitively, influences of parents with more selfish dispersal modes enable cooperative behaviour to thrive.
Our dispersal rule describes the local migration or mobility for individuals, but differs from ones often studied on square lattices [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] . In traditional models of migration, a focal individual moves into an empty site from an occupied one, impacting spatial interactions and the number of interactive individuals; individuals may even become isolated, because of the presence of empty sites. Such dispersal has been considered in evolutionary games for studying the evolution of cooperation [48] [49] [50] [51] and biodiversity [52, 53] . By contrast, here we have proposed two new dispersal modes and have simultaneously incorporated them into different update rules and types of population structures. Under our dispersal rule, an offspring individual replaces a neighbour of its parent. Hence, empty sites in our study arise only temporarily, before being occupied by the offspring individual. Moreover, previous work found that when individuals tend to move into local environments that are favourable for them, cooperation can prevail even under noise conditions [51] . However, in our framework we find that when an offspring individual moves into a local environment whose interactions are favourable for it, cooperation cannot evolve in homogeneous populations. By contrast, when an offspring individual instead moves into a local environment whose interactions are favourable for its parent, cooperation can flourish in structured populations. In addition, compared with the results without offspring-preferred dispersal or parent-preferred dispersal on scale-free networks (electronic supplementary material, figure S1), we find that cooperation can be promoted by offspring-preferred dispersal on scale-free networks. Thus, our work extends local dispersal rules for different types of population structures and enriches the knowledge of local dispersal's effects on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations.
We assume that initially cooperators randomly occupy 50% of the sites in the population, rather than only one site as in [13] . In fact, for that harsh initial condition, the initially existing single cooperator is chosen for reproduction with an extremely small probability on a scale-free network with large population size (e.g. N ¼ 1000). Conversely, the initially existing single cooperator is readily replaced by defectors' offspring with high probability, even under strongly parentpreferred dispersal. Hence, this harsh initial condition can greatly diminish the positive effects induced by strongly parent-preferred dispersal. Accordingly, we have chosen to follow previous works [11, 12] in assuming that cooperators and defectors initially are equally distributed in the population. In addition, we have focused our investigations on the fraction of cooperators, instead of the fixation probability of cooperation. This is because we find that cooperators can coexist with defectors for a long time on scale-free networks for some parameter settings (figure 1c), even if initially half the players are cooperators. Furthermore, we have provided theoretical results from the pairapproximation method only for regular networks. Some improved pair-approximation approaches considering a network's clustering structures and degree fluctuation [46, 54] can be used to predict evolutionary outcomes on scale-free networks. As a promising direction for future research, it will be worthwhile using these approaches for developing more precise analytical tools to confirm our simulation results for scale-free networks [55] .
We have assumed that parents possess local information only about their nearest and next-nearest neighbours, and that their offspring can only occupy a site among the parent's nearest neighbours. That is to say, we have considered a nearest-neighbour dispersal mode. In nature, individuals may possess information about more neighbours and may be able to move into more distant sites. If there are more opportunities for dispersal, defective parents and their offspring may not prefer that the offspring moves into the nearest sites. Instead, both cooperators and defectors will prefer to be surrounded by more layers of cooperators. In this extended framework, it will be worthwhile studying how the non-local parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal modes can be implemented and how they influence the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. In addition, we have not investigated the effects of strategy exploration (behavioural mutation) [40] or imitation errors [56] in the present study. Indeed, when an individual is chosen for reproduction, a mutation may alter the offspring's strategy with a certain probability; likewise, stochastic effects arising from different sorts of errors may play an important role in the evolution of cooperative behaviour. Thus, an interesting future extension of our work is to examine the robustness of our results in the presence of such errors. Finally, we have considered our new dispersal rule for the prisoner's dilemma game described by the simplified payoff matrix of the donation game. Future research may explore the effects of our new dispersal rule for different types of evolutionary games using the universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength [42, 43] , in order to simplify the underlying structure governing social dilemmas and deepen our understanding of the evolution of cooperation driven by dispersal rules.
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